Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a speaker to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Colin McGinn on Meaning (Intending) - Dictionary of Arguments
I 104 Meaning/reference/McGinn: when I use the word "red", I mean something in particular, and that is different from what I mean with other words. >Reference, >Meaning, >Intention, >Intentionality. I 106 Whoever masters the meaning of the word, has never seen the vast majority of the corresponding objects. >Language acquisition. Infinity is created from the outset in the intentionality. That is just the joke of meaning. The meaning allows us to access places, times and distances that cannot be approached by the body and the senses. If one means something with a word, one does not host an isolable element in the stream of mental processes, because the intended meaning does not behave like pain. The meaning does not spread in a medium, in which the individual things are lined up. It is even more important that meaning is diffuse. I 109 It is impossible, to mean something with one word, without that it would be determined what is considered the right expression for this word. (((s) See also the problems in relation to the artificial connective > "tonk".) The intended meaning is the one instance that permits the formation of true or false statements. I 118 Tradition: we know what we mean. >Belief. McGinnVsPrivileged access/meaning: this is a mistake: it may be that we know something of a description, without being able to subordinate it to other descriptions that the immediate known in a theoretical view is perhaps not understandable to us._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
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> Counter arguments against McGinn
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning (Intending)
